Abstract. Jonathan Weisberg claims that certain probability assessments constructed by Jeffrey conditioning resist subsequent revision by a certain type of after-the-fact defeater of the reasons supporting those assessments, and that such conditioning is thus "inherently anti-holistic." His analysis founders, however, in applying Jeffrey conditioning to a partition for which an essential rigidity condition clearly fails. Applied to an appropriate partition, Jeffrey conditioning is amenable to revision by the sort of after-the-fact defeaters considered by Weisberg in precisely the way that he demands.
Holism Denied.
Confirmational holism requires that a belief's empirical justification be sensitive to background belief. For Bayesian epistemology this entails among other things that your probability assessments be amenable to revision in response to the discovery of after-thefact defeaters of reasons supporting those assessments. Jonathan Weisberg (2009) thinks that a certain class of probability assessments constructed by Jeffrey conditioning resist such revision, and that such conditioning is thus "inherently anti-holistic." Typifying such cases is, he claims, the following example: Suppose that E asserts that a certain jelly bean is red, and F asserts that the lighting under which you are to view this jelly bean is contrived to make it appear red, whether it is or not. Let p be your prior probability measure on the algebra generated by E and , F and suppose that (1) 0 < ( ), ( ) 1 p E p F  .
One can easily imagine scenarios in which
and Weisberg postulates this independence condition. Suppose now that you have the opportunity to view the jelly bean, which results in your having the non-doxastic experience "as of red," denoted E. This experience is assumed to increase your confidence in E , though perhaps not rendering E certain for you. How should you revise p in the light of this experience?
Weisberg has you revise p by Jeffrey conditioning on the partition { , }, EE thereby updating p to the probability measure q given by 
and conditions (2) , (7), and (8) imply that
In short, the rigidity conditions (7) and (8) q In the present case, where A is an element of the algebra generated by E and F , this condition is easily seen to be equivalent simply to the conjunction of conditions (7) and (8) . Now (7) is perfectly reasonable (why should learning that the jelly bean is red prompt you to revise your probability that the contrived lighting was in effect?). But (8) 
Weisberg may protest that, on the contrary, he is no fan of rigidity , and that he has made this clear in the statement (Weisberg 2009 , p. 807), "We can gloss this point as follows: rigidity implies the absence of after-the-fact, undercutting defeaters for non-doxastic reasons." But there is a difference between disliking rigidity because of its consequences, and declining to embrace it on prima facie grounds of unreasonableness. Of course Weisberg understands that (3) implies both (7) and (8). But his pragmatic understanding of this relation is that once one has opted for (3) as an updating rule, (7) and (8) come along as consequences, whether one likes it or not. This gets things exactly backwards, for judging that (7) and (8) are reasonable is a precondition for employing (3) . Failing to grasp this fact renders one powerless to critique (7) or (8) on grounds independent of their consequences. And it leads Weisberg to think that he has discovered a serious defect in Jeffrey's rule. For, he argues, p has been updated to q by Jeffrey's rule in response to E, with the result that q cannot be repaired by conditioning in response to the discovery that F . And since, he claims, Jeffrey's rule fails to provide any guidance regarding the choice of the partition on which to update, Jeffrey conditionalizers are stuck with updating p on the partition { , } EE , whether they like it or not. But this conflates two issues. It is certainly true that Jeffrey has specified no procedure for picking out a uniquely rational partition on which to update. 5 But he has furnished grounds for rejecting the application of Jeffrey updating to any particular partition, namely, the considered judgment that rigidity is unwarranted for that partition. To demand more than that is to fundamentally misunderstand the role that Jeffrey intended his rule to play in probability revision.
Holism Attained.
If it is unreasonable to update p to q by formula (3) in response to the experience E , is there a different partition to which Jeffrey's rule could be applied, and which would yield a posterior amenable to correction by conditioning in light of the discovery that F?
Consider the partition { , E F E F  }. Since either E or F makes it more likely that you will experience E, having that experience should lead you to revise () 
the first factor on the right hand side of (14) being positive by (13), and the second factor being negative by Theorem , the following heuristic argument also highlights this inequality : Condition (2) holds by design, condition (7) is, as we have argued, unexceptionable, and condition (6) expresses the minimally acceptable effect of discovering the defeater .
F But (2), (6) , and (7) 
, the latter two equalities following, respectively, from (7) and (2). 2. In The Logic of Decision (1965, section 11.3) Jeffrey expresses condition (I) by saying that "the passage of experience has led the agent to change his degree of belief in" E from () pE to () qE , while expressing condition (II) by saying that the change from p to q "originated in" . E
The latter terminology is unfortunate in perhaps not conveying in the most memorable way that condition (II) is a prerequisite for applying the updating formula (3), and not simply a consequence of applying that formula. But in the illustrative example ("The mudrunner")
immediately following these remarks, it is clear that condition (II) is being checked for reasonableness prior to applying (3), for Jeffrey says "However, the forecast should have no effect on his degrees of belief in the proposition that the horse will win conditionally on the course being muddy, or on its not being muddy. unambiguous terms that one must judge that condition (II) is satisfied before applying formula (3). In the mudrunner example this judgment occurs almost effortlessly. In other cases, however, one may need to think long and hard about whether rigidity is reasonably assumed. One can, of course, overlook some subtlety and judge wrongly in this regard. But a conscious effort to judge whether it is reasonable to embrace rigidity needs to be made before one decides to employ the updating formula (3).
3. Jeffrey actually applies the term parochialism to the error of updating p to q by strict conditioning on E without considering whether the invariance condition ( | ) ( | ) q A E p A E  is reasonably assumed for all events A in the relevant algebra. But it is implicit that the term is also applicable to the error of updating on a partition without checking condition (II).
4. I suppose it is conceivable that Weisberg intends the phrase "experience directly changes your credences" to mean not simply that you have come to assign new probabilities to the events i E , but that you have given conscious consideration to whether anything in that experience warrants disturbing any of the prior conditional probabilities ( | ) EE But Weisberg seems to mean by this phrase simply "not using an updating formula having the form
." To term this a "violation" of Jeffrey's rule seems very strange. After all, Jeffrey never claimed that his rule was the be-all-and-end-all of probability revision. Indeed, he devised an entirely different method of probability revision (Jeffrey, 1991 (Jeffrey, , 1995 the point that Jeffrey conditioning, when applicable, is simply a labor-saving tool that cuts down on the number of events whose probabilities need to be reassessed. We may fail to make the most efficient use of this tool by updating on a finer partition than we need to, and we may overlook evidence that would alter certain conditional probabilities in such a way that revision by Jeffrey conditioning on a particular partition is inapplicable. But such oversights and mistakes are correctable. The important thing is, in the spirit of holism, to be alert to the possibility of their occurring.
6. This odds rigidity is equivalent to (and often more salient than) the more familiar conditional probability rigidity criterion for updating by Jeffrey conditioning. See Jeffrey (1992, p.125), noting that there is only one way for the event EF  to materialize, since the algebra on which p and * q are defined is assumed here to be simply the algebra generated by E and . F
